Al-Qaida, Pakistan, Taliban, Terrorism / counterterrorism
This article argues that not only has the counterterrorism (CT) commitment in Pakistan been ad hoc in recent years, but that the country’s articulation of a softer type of CT response has been rhetorical at best. The research further highlights that Pakistan’s attempts to craft a scientifically structured counter narrative are neither traditional nor within the country’s current CT capability. The article’s arguments are analyzed through a guiding framework based on the compiled works of various strategic communication experts, and helps illustrate the narrative landscapes of al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban as explored and pitched vis-à-vis the state’s counter-narrative paradigm. The findings also probe the national mindset of Pakistanis amenability and appeal for terrorism. The result of this research posits an underlying question as to how then does Pakistan move forward in coping with increasing terrorist threats within its borders while simultaneously developing a coherent and fully functional counter terrorism effort in the future.
Feyyaz, Muhammad. “Why Pakistan Does Not Have a Counterterrorism Narrative.” Journal of Strategic Security 8, no. 1 (2015): 63-78.
Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss1/5